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ABSTRACT. A buyout deal involves several parties, including private equity firms, the target com-
pany, and lending banks. All these parties are legally connected by contractual arrangements, and 
covenants among all interest parties are important. However, a comprehensive study on designing cov-
enants among parties in a buyout deal to achieve commitment and avoid risk in closing a deal is seldom 
seen in current literature. By investigating one of the world’s largest buyout deals – the acquisition 
of Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), this paper not only probes into the design of contracts and 
covenant, but also provides several managerial implications. This paper concludes that well-designed 
covenants in buy-out deals can appropriately align all participants’ diversified interests.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A lot of evidence from many studies suggest that the 
incidence of attaining private equity significantly im-
proves a firm’s subsequent ability to attract financial 
capital, research partners, and commercial partners 
(Folta, Janney 2004); moreover, from the viewpoint 
of such business transactions, well-designed cov-
enants are of great importance in facilitating buyout 
and relevant deals. Argyres and Mayer (2007) offer 
a framework for research into how transaction costs 
and property rights impact opportunity discovery 
and sustainable advantage, thereby linking entre-
preneurship and strategic management research. 
Covenants are contractual provisions that obligate a 
contracting party to take certain actions (affirmative 
covenants) or restrict the party from taking certain 
actions (negative covenants). They reflect contracting 
parties’ difficulties in anticipating unknown future 
events and opportunistic behavior by other parties. 
Covenants have played a crucial role in financial 
buyout and other PE-involved contracts. However, 
despite the increasingly important role of the cov-
enant design in PE deals in recent years, there has 
been a serious lack of in-depth rigorous inquiries into 
comprehensive covenant design. To bridge this gap, 
this article studies the covenant design in the buy-
out deal of Hospital Corporation of America (HCA). 
HCA, mainly located in the United States, is the 
largest hospital chain in the world. The $33 billion 
buyout of HCA by Bain Capital, KKR, and Merrill 
Lynch Private Equity has been the world’s largest 
deal up to 2006. As the HCA buyout deal is a rep-
resentative case among others, we believe that the 
covenant designs for this transaction is worthwhile 
to explore in depth. In this study, the main research 
questions are the following: What kinds of covenants 
are required in a buyout deal, and what mechanisms 
PE firms use to constrain potential risks with the 
counter parties, the target company (including the 
management), and the lending banks? In the first 
part of this article, we review the relevant literature 
about covenant in financial deals, especially those 
involving PE as a contracting party. Based on the 
literature review, we thereafter propose a concep-
tual framework. In the second part, we describe the 
methodology, investigate the HCA case, and probe 
the mechanisms of covenant design. In the final part, 
we discuss our findings and a number of managerial 
implications.* Corresponding author. E-mail: tpdong@ntnu.edu.tw
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPT 
DEVELOPMENT
Covenants are ubiquitous in financial contracts 
such as public debt, private debt, and private 
equity (Kaplan, Stromberg 2003). Covenants are 
used in financial contracts to mitigate agency 
problems and help secure financing through the 
pledging of contingent control rights (Dewatripont, 
Tirole 1994). Singer and Donoso (2011) develops 
an agency model subject to moral hazard to study 
the general structure of the contract offered by a 
firm (the principal) to several contractors (agents) 
that perform the same task. Covenants can also 
prevent value reduction and define control rights 
(gorton, Winton 2003). Debt covenants and repay-
ment requirements provide clear constraints and 
guidelines for managers (Lichtenberg, Siegel 1990). 
Therefore, covenants and monitoring are occasion-
ally viewed as the least pricey way for lenders to 
mitigate credit risk in the absence of alternatives 
(Whitehead 2009). Because of repeated buyout 
transactions, PE firms have accumulated signifi-
cant expertise in designing covenants. Therefore, 
empirical study suggests that PE-sponsored loans 
include more financial covenants than non-spon-
sored ones (Achleitner et al. 2012).
Covenant levels are determined partly by the 
amount of borrower information that a lender pos-
sesses or can inexpensively acquire (Denis, Mihov 
2003). Debt can also help limit the waste of free 
cash flow by forcing managers to make debt pay-
ments, resulting in reduced agency costs (Smith 
1990). Moreover, research on the complexity of 
contracts argues and finds that asset specificity 
is an important transactional attribute affecting 
contract design (e.g., Joskow 1988). K. Foss and 
n. J. Foss (2008) found that individuals or firms 
that introduce new improved contractual designs, 
sorting systems, organization structures, etc., may 
realize an entrepreneurial return based on the 
lowering of transaction costs. And other research 
findings reveal that contractual complexity varies 
a great deal from one alliance to another (reuer, 
Ariño 2007).
Agency theory is occasionally used to under-
stand how PE firms may design covenant mecha-
nisms to overcome existing management problems 
and create value, and previous research has pro-
vided a strong indication that ownership concen-
tration and presence of private equity investors can 
be powerful tools in corporate governance (Bruton 
et al. 2010). Tieva and Junnonen (2009) note that 
essential features of proactive contracting on con-
tract management are also risks and risk manage-
ment. Therefore, contract preparation and negotia-
tions are salient poles. Straub (2009) shows that 
performance-based maintenance contracts reduce 
both direct and indirect costs compared to a com-
petitive tendering approach. Deligonul et al. (2008) 
examine entrepreneurship as a puzzle where en-
trepreneurs venture at a risk-return level that is 
worse than that of the private equity index and 
much worse than the public equity index. Scellato 
and Ughetto (2013) found that private equity funds 
might have incentives to undertake and exit deals, 
pointing to practices that allow them to extract 
fees and raise new funds more quickly. Used for 
studying buyout deals, agency theory emphasizes 
controlling and motivating managers’ behavior to 
improve performance (Wright et al. 2001). Solu-
tions to agency cost problems in buyouts primarily 
focus on reducing cost (Jensen 1989) and maximiz-
ing profit (Delmar et al. 2003) and “control,” which 
arises from financial monitoring through sophis-
ticated contracts to eliminate managerial discre-
tion and costs (Jensen, Meckling 1976). Besides, 
as environments become increasingly competitive, 
the political context of organizational contracting 
decisions becomes a central determinant of the 
organization’s ability to achieve greater flexibility 
and ultimately greater efficiency (goodstein et al. 
1996).
In addition to agency costs, the private eq-
uity acquisition must also deal with asymmetric 
information, incentives mechanism, a long-term 
relationship with imperfect contracting and other 
issues. The contracting of a buyout deal repre-
sents great business and legal skills in reducing 
information asymmetry between transacting par-
ties, and high-quality contracting can occasionally 
facilitate deal negotiations (gilson 1984). Doornik 
(2006) notes that when performance is not verifi-
able, firms in a long-term relationship may rely on 
incentive contracts that are self-enforced or “rela-
tional”. optimal contracts look the same in each 
period as long as the relationship continues, but 
may require termination of the relationship after 
bad outcomes. Payments between the partners 
depend on their relative performance. In essence, 
contract terms that are aimed at reducing agency 
problems take account of the following (Cullen, 
Hickman 2001): How much the agent’s work con-
tributes to the principal’s marginal profits; The 
extent that ‘noisy’, (i.e. incomplete) information, 
distorts the principal’s ability to accurately moni-
tor the agent’s performance; Factors which reward 
or penalize behavior that is required or not; As-
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sess the optimal value of the agent’s contribution 
for the principal, having considered the extent 
that the agent is averse to carrying risks. Further-
more, when contracts cannot be fully state-contin-
gent, delegated contracting gains a potential ad-
vantage over centralization. Ultimately, however, 
a satisfactory theory of organization design must 
address both incentive considerations and limit-
ed information-processing capabilities (Melumad 
et al. 1997).
2.1. A conceptual framework of covenants in 
a buyout deal
Drawing from the literature, this study proposes a 
conceptual framework for the covenants designed 
for different counter parties. This study analyzes 
covenants designed for PE firms, banks, and the 
target company. Between PE firms and target com-
panies, several important contracts are involved, 
including a term sheet, a purchase agreement, and 
management or employment agreements. These 
agreements imply interests and concerns behind 
both parties, and a careful examination of these 
agreements is important to discover both parties’ 
thoughts.
Among PE firms, target companies, and banks, 
loan agreements are essential. Using a sample of 
180 public-to-private LBos in the U.S. between 
1997 and 2007, Demiroglu and James (2010) found 
that reputable private equity firms pay fewer loan 
spreads, have longer loan maturities, and use less 
”traditional” bank debt. In addition, the reputa-
tion of the PE firm is positively related to buyout 
leverage. Favorable loans rely on well-designed 
covenants. Covenants between banks and bor-
rowers use cash flow control, strategy control, the 
default trigger, balance sheet maintenance, and 
asset preservation (Arnold 1982). The conceptual 
framework of covenant design in a PE deal is il-

















Fig. 1. A conceptual framework of covenants in a 
buyout deal
3. METHODOLOGY
As the above literature review reveals, some aca-
demic attention on PE covenant design probe into 
the transactions from pure theoretic lens, whereas 
others treat covenant as a general financial con-
tracting phenomenon and neglect the important 
details in the real business transactions. There-
fore, we believe observing and analyzing a real 
deal structure and contractual design can help fill 
a gap in current literature. To obtain rich data 
and insight into the context, actors, and processes 
of covenant design, we used a classic single case 
approach (yin 1984). We believe the case study 
approach, different from approaches adopted by 
current literature, can help illustrate the real busi-
ness concerns and managerial implications associ-
ated with covenant design.
We chose HCA, the biggest buyout transac-
tion in the years up to and including 2006, as our 
sample firm (and the unit of analysis) to address 
the unique covenant mechanism in the hospital 
industry. An in-depth case study enabled us to 
understand how PE firms designed covenants to 
create value for HCA. Starting from a descriptive 
and explanatory angle to the HCA deal, we iden-
tified the key actors involved in the buyout and 
examined their rationale for mechanisms relating 
to financial strategies, processes, and management 
practice.
Data for the case was searched in two catego-
ries: 1) academic publications and 2) selected busi-
ness publications, including the Economist, Har-
vard Business Press, etc. In addition, the following 
electronic databases were searched: ProQuest ABI, 
SSrn, and EBSCohost. This study also obtained 
public information such as company web sites, 
press releases, and information disclosed under 
SEC regulations (e.g., prospectuses). To ensure the 
completeness of the data search, we also selected 
articles focusing on PE and buyout aspects and 
practices for covenant design and value creation. 
In deciding whether to include a particular con-
tractual arrangement in our research, we focused 
on whether the contract stipulated important ob-
ligations by one of the contracting parties, rather 
than whether it was literally named a ”covenant” 
in legal documents.
4. CASE STUDY
In this section, HCA’s history, debt restructuring, 
and covenant mechanisms are discussed.
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4.1. The history of HCA
Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) was found-
ed in nashville in 1968 by Dr Thomas Frist, Sr., 
Henry Hooker, and Jack Massey to provide com-
munities with better-quality healthcare. HCA’s 
chairman, Thomas J. Frist, is an innovative en-
trepreneur and initiated several financial opera-
tions, including a $5.3 billion management buyout 
in 1988 and acquisition of the Louisville-based Co-
lumbia Hospital Corporation in a stock swap worth 
$5.7 billion in 1994. In early 2006, Thomas Frist 
met with his financial advisor, Merrill Lynch, and 
initiated a leveraged buyout idea. on november 
17, 2006, HCA entered into a buyout agreement 
with a PE consortium (Bain Capital, KKr, and 
Merrill Lynch Private Equity) worth $33 billion.
4.2. Debt restructuring
Among the total amount of acquisition funds 
($32,970 million), the debt (accounted for $27,813 
million. The debt included senior secured credit 
facilities, outstanding notes, and retained indebt-
edness. Senior secured credit facilities amounted 
to $14,364 million and contained an asset-based 
revolving credit facility and three term loans. 
These credit facilities had a maturity period of 
6 to 7 years. The outstanding notes amounted to 
$5,700 million. HCA issued new notes, due in 2014 
to 2016, listed in the public market to exchange for 
the existing notes. In the notes exchange offers, 
HCA did not receive any cash proceeds from the 
exchange issued. As for the retained unsecured in-
debtedness, it consisted of term notes ranging from 
4 to 8 years with a weighted average interest rate 
of 6.91% to 8.75%. Table 1 lists the sources of the 
funds from the debt for the buyout deal.
Table 1. The sources of the funds from the 
indebtedness
Sources of funds ($ Million)
Senior secured credit facilities –
Asset-based revolving credit facility 1,535
Revolving credit facility –
Term loan A facility 2,750
Term loan B facility 8,800
European term loan facility 1,279
outstanding notes 5,700
Retained existing secured indebtedness 230
Retained existing unsecured indebtedness 7,519
Other sources 5,157
Total sources of funds 32,970
Source: Adapted from the S-4 prospectus filed on 
September 25, 2007.
4.3. The covenant mechanisms
Contracts with covenants in a buyout deal main-
ly include a term sheet, a purchase agreement, 
management and employee agreements, and loan 
agreements. Contracts between PE firms and the 
target company include a term sheet and a pur-
chase agreement. Contracts between PE firms and 
people in the target company include management 
and employee agreements. Contracts between 
lending banks and PE firms and the target compa-
ny are loan agreements. In this study, we explore 
and analyze the covenant mechanisms among all 
parties as follows.
4.3.1. Covenants between PE firms and  
the target company: a term sheet and  
a purchase agreement
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), PE firms 
design covenants regarding cash flow rights, con-
trol rights, and liquidation rights. The authors 
found that if the target company performs poorly, 
the PE firms would obtain full control of these 
rights. As the company performance improves, 
the target company obtains more control rights. 
If the target company performs very well, the PE 
firms would retain only their cash flow rights, but 
waive most of their control and liquidation rights. 
The cash flow, control, and liquidation rights allo-
cations shift gradually with performance and are 
interrelated. In other words, if the target company 
performs better, then the PE firm has less con-
trol. Contracts between the target company and 
PE firms mainly contain a term sheet and a pur-
chase agreement. In this section, we first analyze 
key elements of the covenants and then discuss the 
HCA case study.
4.3.1.1. Term sheet
In a term sheet, some key elements must be in-
cluded. In the beginning of a term sheet, the open-
ing information and new securities offered are 
set forth. The agreement describes a summary of 
terms, new securities issued, total amount raised, 
number of shares, and purchase price per share. In 
addition, dividend provisions, liquidation prefer-
ence, redemption right, auto conversion right, anti-
dilution, right of first refusal, information right, 
and other rights are included.
4.3.1.2. Analysis
The details of the term sheet are usually not re-
leased publicly, and only some information is 
available. Therefore, we summarized and analyzed 
the key issues of a term sheet. HCA’s term sheet 
emphasized a special shareholder meeting, the 
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purchase agreement, and other important consid-
erations.
A special meeting was held for the vote on 
a proposal to adopt the buyout agreement. All 
holders of HCA Common Stock as of the close of 
business on october 6, 2006, the record date for 
the special meeting, were entitled to vote at this 
meeting. other important considerations mainly 
referred to the special committee and its recom-
mendation. The special committee was a commit-
tee composed of HCA’s board of directors formed 
on June 30, 2006, that reviewed, evaluated, and, 
as appropriate, negotiated a possible transaction 
relating to the sale of the company. The special 
committee, comprising five independent and dis-
interested directors, determined that the merger 
agreement and the transactions contemplated, in-
cluding the merger, were fair to and in the best 
interests of the shareholders except the Frists and 
their affiliates. The committee recommended to 
HCA’s board of directors that the merger be ap-
proved and declared. The board of directors then 
recommended the purchase agreement be adopted 
by the shareholders.
4.3.1.3. Purchase agreement
The purchase agreement normally contains key 
factors of the term sheet. A buyout agreement lays 
out when an owner can sell his major interest in 
the business to outside investors or management 
teams in the business. In addition to some normal 
terms, PE firms request additional covenants to 
complete a transaction in a buyout agreement. The 
covenants include regulatory filings, shareholder 
meetings, notification of certain matters, closing 
date and financial statements, real estate, further 
assurances, and services provided by the PE firm. 
1) regulatory filings force the PE firm and the 
target company to cooperate with each other and 
follow applicable laws to consummate the trans-
actions as promptly as practicable. Both parties 
must, upon request by any other party, deliver to 
the other party, including the PE firm’s affiliates, 
directors, officers, and shareholders, all informa-
tion connected to any statement, filing, or notice. 
2) A shareholder meeting ensures that the target 
company must take all necessary actions to gain 
approvals from shareholders. The approval items 
include the purchase agreement, the transaction, 
the debt documents if any, the support service 
agreement by the PE firm, and the election of new 
directors nominated by the PE firm. 3) Each party 
in the transaction must promptly notify its coun-
ter party if there is any material adverse change, 
or any circumstance that could be expected to 
cause a warranty from the PE firm to be untrue 
or inaccurate. 4) regarding the closing date and 
financial statements, the target company must de-
liver a completed portfolio file and an un-audited 
balance sheet as at the last day in the calendar 
month in which the transaction is completed. 5) 
Some PE firms request the target company sell its 
real estate or assets to fulfill the required working 
capital. 6) Further assurances require the PE firm 
and the target company to make their best efforts 
to complete the transaction. 7) Services provided 
by the PE firm to the target company before the 
closing date indicate that the PE firm will provide 
personnel and related expertise to complete the 
deal, and sometimes, the PE firm charges for these 
services.
4.3.1.4. Analysis
The purchase agreement contains the purchase 
consideration, treatment of options and awards, 
representations and warranties, conduct of busi-
ness, additional agreements, conditions to the pur-
chase, and termination. HCA Inc., a leading health 
care service company in the US, was the target 
company. PE firms including Bain, KKr, and Mer-
rill Lynch global Private Equity formed a com-
pany called Hercules Holding II, LLC (Hercules 
Holding) as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) for the 
merger. The company has not engaged in any busi-
ness. Hercules Acquisition Corporation (Hercules 
Acquisition), a direct wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Hercules Holding II, LLC, was also formed solely 
for the merger. The sponsors of Hercules Holding 
II, LLC, include not only the PE firms but also 
HCA founder Thomas Frist and entities affiliated 
with Thomas Frist. The Frists committed to con-
tribute a portion of their shares of HCA Common 
Stock to Hercules Holding. on July 24, 2006, Her-
cules Acquisition merged with HCA, Inc., which 
acted as the surviving corporation and executed 
the purchase of HCA.
After the merger was completed, common 
stock shareholders were entitled to receive $51 
in cash for each share, without interest and less 
any applicable withholding taxes. All outstanding 
stock options and restricted shares became fully 
vested and immediately exercisable. All such op-
tions not exercised before the merger were can-
celled and converted into the right to receive a 
cash payment equal to the number of shares of 
HCA common stock underlying the options mul-
tiplied by the amount by which $51.00 exceeded 
the option exercise price, without interest and less 
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any applicable withholding taxes. Certain options 
held by some of the management rollover holders 
would be converted into options to acquire shares 
of common stock of the surviving corporation. In 
addition to the purchase considerations and treat-
ment of options and awards analyzed above, we 
focus on covenants regarding representations and 
warranties, termination, and some important ad-
ditional agreements. HCA made representations 
and warranties to the PE firms and the PE firms 
to HCA. From HCA’s perspective, representations 
and warranties related to capital structure, docu-
ments filed with the SEC, undisclosed liabilities, 
litigation, tax matters, compliance with applicable 
laws, contracts with affiliates, and state takeover 
statutes. Many of HCA’s warranties were qualified 
by a material adverse effect standard, and viola-
tions of these warranties thus enable PE firms 
to legally withdraw from the transaction. For 
the merger agreement, “material adverse effect”1 
prevented downside risks for the PE firms. rep-
resentations and warranties can be viewed as a 
contractual mechanism that solves the problem of 
adverse selection. As HCA had better information 
about the quality of the asset to be sold than the 
PE firms did, significant information asymmetry 
existed between the seller and the buyers. In this 
sense, the voluminous and detailed representations 
and warranties can bridge the information gap by 
conveying to the buyers, the PE firms, many de-
tails regarding HCA’s business assets, liabilities, 
and potential liabilities. HCA, on the other hand, 
may be able to make the information it provided 
credible by promising in the termination clause to 
compensate the PE firms if the information turned 
out to be false. In this sense, representations and 
warranties are designed as inexpensive techniques 
for PE firms to verify the accuracy of information 
provided by HCA.
As to the termination of the purchase agree-
ment, if the agreement failed to be approved by 
the shareholders meeting, the PE firms would 
reimburse HCA’s expenses up to $50 million. If 
any party, HCA or the PE firms, terminated the 
agreement, the party had to pay a termination fee 
amounting to $500 million or $300 million, respec-
tively. HCA Inc. had to pay a termination fee to 
PE firms if 1) HCA received another acquisition 
proposal that was superior, 2) the board of direc-
1 Material adverse effect is defined to mean any event, 
state of facts, and change that is materially adverse to 
the business or results of operations of HCA and its 
subsidiaries, other than changes in general economic, 
industry, or political conditions.
tors recommended to the shareholders a superior 
proposal, 3) HCA’s shareholders failed to adopt 
the merger agreement, or 4) HCA provided ma-
terial breach of representations, warranties, or 
covenants such that the closing conditions would 
not be satisfied. However, the PE firms were ob-
ligated to pay a termination fee to HCA Inc. if 1) 
the merger was not completed on or before Decem-
ber 19, 2006, or January 31, 2007, if the market-
ing period had not ended, 2) PE firms committed 
material breach of representations, warranties, or 
covenants such that the closing conditions would 
not be satisfied, or 3) certain conditions to the ob-
ligations of the PE firms had been satisfied and 
PE firms failed to consummate the merger no later 
than five calendar days after the final day of the 
marketing period.
The PE firms agreed to arrange debt financing 
to fund the proposed merger and relevant expens-
es. HCA agreed to cooperate in connection with the 
refinancing. HCA also agreed to redeem certain 
existing notes with interest rates between 5.25% 
and 8.85% due from 2007 to 2009 and to issue 
new notes on terms and conditions as required by 
the terms of the indenture governing such notes. 
The completion of such offers was contingent upon 
the completion of the proposed merger. regarding 
expenses in relation to refinancing, the PE firms 
would reimburse HCA. The parties may have 
amended the merger agreement after the share-
holders approved the merge, but cannot amend the 
one that required further approval by sharehold-
ers. The amendments included extending the time 
for performing obligations and waiving inaccura-
cies in the representations and warranties.
4.3.2. Covenants between PE firms and  
the management: management and  
employment agreements
The PE firms carefully designed management in-
centive programs and structured a mechanism for 
“pay to performance”. The firms therefore success-
fully turned agency problems into profitable re-
sults. Covenant design has been an important ap-
proach for reducing agency costs and moral hazard 
in many transactions. Put more clearly, this ap-
proach to reducing moral hazard involves design-
ing a contract under which the agent receives a 
financial reward for working in ways that promote 
the principal’s interest.
The incentive programs fell into three catego-
ries: base salary, short-term target incentives, and 
long-term incentive grants. The average base sal-
ary remained unchanged as before. regarding the 
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group intended to divest HCA 5 years later and 
was eager to help the target company reach its 
highest value within the holding period. For the 
vesting schedule, HCA used three criteria: time 
vesting, a normal approach in other companies; 
the EBITDA-based approach, again indicating 
that private equity firms put significant empha-
sis on the management teams’ cash-generating 
abilities; and an approach aligned with the PE’s 
investment returns. As long as the management 
teams achieved the PE firms’ investment return 
objective, the teams would be rewarded. Table 2 
summarizes the incentive programs and their im-
plications.
4.3.3. Covenants between lending banks and 
PE firms with the target company:  
Loan agreements
The covenants in the loan agreements we studied 
were primarily promises that HCA made about its 
continuing financial condition. Those covenants 
include maintaining the target company’s assets, 
restrictions on fundamental changes in the com-
pany, dividend payments, transactions with affili-
ates, and incurring additional indebtedness. To a 
certain degree, lenders can monitor their loans by 
verifying compliance with these covenants.
Arnold (1982) suggested that loan lenders are 
most concerned about borrowers’ earning power, 
cash flow generation, and business risks. To make 
sure a borrower will pay down its borrowings, 
banks often use several types of restrictions to con-
trol it. The types of restrictions include cash flow 
control, strategy control, the default trigger, bal-
ance sheet maintenance, and asset preservation. 
Cash flow control permits bankers to monitor bor-
rowers’ cash flow and limits borrowers from doing 
excessive dividends and stock repurchases. Bank-
ers normally monitor EBIT to monitor a borrower’s 
cash flow. Strategy control occurs if a borrower’s 
resources are ill-matched with its opportunities 
and risks. In such cases, bankers normally reduce 
short-term incentive program, the purpose was to 
reward participating managers and employees for 
annual financial and nonfinancial performance, to 
provide high-quality health care for patients and 
increase shareholder value. A target performance 
award was set in the senior management incen-
tive program. Each participant in the program was 
assigned an annual award target expressed as a 
percentage of salary ranging from 30% to 120%. 
HCA also set a threshold: meeting 50% of the tar-
get was the minimum, and reaching 200% of the 
target was the maximum limit. The purpose of 
the long-term incentive program was to retain key 
executive talent, to link executive compensation 
to long-term performance, and to deliver value to 
employees in a manner that maximized economic 
and tax effectiveness for HCA. HCA had separate 
programs for executive officers and employees. In 
addition to the consummation of the recapitaliza-
tion, HCA implemented a stock incentive plan for 
approximately 1,500 employees to receive options 
covering up to 10% of the fully diluted equity.
PE firms encourage managers to earn bonuses 
by obtaining outstanding operation results rath-
er than carrying out daily operations. regarding 
short-term target incentives, the management 
teams under study were reviewed based on EBIT-
DA only instead of purely EPS or a combination 
of EPS and EBITDA. one reason is that EPS is 
a less meaningful measure to a company focusing 
on long-term development. Another reason may be 
that, due to the nature of private equity, cash flow 
is more important than profit performance since, 
for a normal buyout deal completed at an enor-
mous amount of outside capital, being able to pay 
back interest has become extremely important. 
This kind of short-term design forces manage-
ment teams to focus more on cash flow manage-
ment. regarding the long-term program, PE firms 
prefer stock options to be vested in shorter periods 
of 5 years. PE firms normally hold portfolio com-
panies for 3 to 5 years, which implies that the PE 
Table 2. HCA’s incentive program and its implications in 2007
Post buyout Implications
Base salary  – The same as before  – Compensation is not based on an increase in base salary 
but on short- and long-term performance
Short-term incentive  – Depends only on EBITDA  – Cash flow generation abilities are more important than 
I/S performance
Long-term incentive  – only the stock options: 5 years
 – 1/3: time
 – 1/3: EBITDA
 – 1/3: PE’s investment returns
 – The vesting period is shorter and in consistent with PE’s 
holding period
 – PE firms focus more on cash generation with EBITDA 
as a performance criterion
Source: Adapted from the 2007 annual report and adjusted for this study.
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investments in certain products or technology by 
limiting capital expenditures and acquisitions or 
writing in a debt-to-equity test. Default trigger 
means the lender’s rights to call back the loans 
or ask for corrective actions. Lenders seldom use 
default triggers, and this mechanism is mainly to 
protect lenders from losses or borrowers’ misbe-
havior. Lenders keep an eye on the strength of the 
balance sheet and the degree of business risk. Bal-
ance sheet maintenance is to ascertain that a bor-
rower does not harm its balance sheet by excessive 
leveraging or by financing fixed assets with short-
term loans, which reduce the borrower’s net work-
ing capital. To reach the goals, lenders impose a 
current ratio, a net working-capital minimum, and 
a debt-to-equity ratio. Assets are deemed the ulti-
mate source of repayment by lenders, and hence, 
they do not want to see assets sold or pledged to 
other creditors. Preserving assets is also very im-
portant to lenders. After understanding what loan 
lenders care about borrowers, the research could 
use it as a basic covenant framework to discover 
what interests and concerns beyond banks or other 
institutional lenders while designing loan facilities 
and covenants with private equity firms together 
with the target company in a buyout deal. The fol-
lowing summarizes the covenant analytical frame-
work. In Table 3, the objectivities and approaches 
for loan covenants are summarized.
To complete the HCA buyout, several banks 
committed to make loans to PE firms with HCA 
and its subsidiaries as guarantors. The debt com-
mitments included senior secured credit facili-
ties and senior secured second lien loans under 
a bridge facility. For the senior secured credit fa-
cilities, Bank of America (BoA), JPMorgan Chase 
Bank (JPMCB), Citigroup global Markets Inc. 
(CgMI), and Merrill Lynch Capital Corporation 
(MLCC) committed to provide (each committing 
to 25%) to HCA and its European subsidiaries up 
to $16.80 billion of senior secured credit facilities. 
The purpose of these facilities was to finance the 
buyout, refinance certain existing indebtedness of 
HCA and its subsidiaries, pay transaction fees for 
this buyout, and provide ongoing working capital. 
When the merger was completed, HCA made only 
$14,365 million of loans including facilities of as-
set-based revolving credit, revolving credit, term 
loan A, term loan B, and European term loan. As 
for the senior secured second lien loans under a 
bridge loan, Citigroup global Markets Inc., Bank of 
America Bridge, JPMorgan Chase Bank (JPMCB), 
and Merrill Lynch Capital Corporation committed 
to provide (each committing to 25%) to HCA up to 
$5.70 billion of senior secured second lien loans 
under a bridge facility. This bridge facility would 
be made only if the offering of secured second lien 
notes by HCA was not completed substantially 
concurrently with the buyout. The purpose of the 
bridge facility was similar to the senior secured 
credit facilities except for the working capital.
The interest rate for the senior secured credit 
facilities should be an applicable margin plus ei-
ther London Interbank offered rate (LIBor) or 
the higher of the prime rate of Bank of America 
and the federal funds rate (FFr) plus 0.50%. As for 
the bridge facility, it had a floating interest rate 
equal to LIBor plus a spread that increased over 
time, up to $1.5 billion, by issuing additional loans 
or exchange notes.
The debt guarantors of senior secured cred-
it facilities except the European term facilities 
were each existing and future direct and indi-
rect, wholly-owned material domestic subsidiar-
ies of HCA and the European term facility, which 
would be guaranteed by each existing and future 
wholly-owned European subsidiary of HCA. The 
asset-based revolving credit facility was secured 
Table 3. The objectivities and approaches for loan covenants
Restrictions objectivities Approaches
Cash flow control  – Secure debt and interest payment  – EBIT
Strategy control  – Prevent from ill-matched strategies  – Limiting capital expenditures and 
acquisitions
 – Debt-to-equity test
Default trigger  – Provide rights to call the loan or ask for 
correction
 – Healthy balance sheet
 – Controllable business risks
Balance sheet mainte-
nance
 – Prevent from excessive leveraging or 
financing fixed assets with  
short-term loans
 – Current ratio, net working capital 
minimum, D/E limit, no additional 
borrowings
Asset preservation  – Prevent from significant assets sold or 
pledged to other creditors.
 – negative pledge clause
Source: Adapted from Arnold (1982) and adjusted for this study.
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by a first-priority lien on all present and future 
accounts receivable (Ar) of the guarantors. other 
senior secured credit facilities were secured by a 
second-priority lien on accounts receivable, a first-
priority lien on capital stocks, and substantially all 
present and future assets of guarantors. However, 
the debt guarantors of senior secured second lien 
facilities were HCA and its domestic subsidiaries. 
The debts were secured by a second-priority lien 
on the non-accounts-receivable and by a third-
priority lien on certain of the accounts receivable.
The senior secured credit facilities contained 
several affirmative and negative covenants. The 
covenants included restrictions on indebtedness, 
investments, sales of assets, and mergers, meet-
ing the restriction of strategy control and asset 
preservation. A minimum interest coverage ratio 
was also included and reached the restriction of 
cash flow control. The maximum total leverage ra-
tio represented the restriction of the balance sheet 
balance. The covenant of customary events of de-
faults referred to the default trigger. As a result, 
the covenants of this loan agreement contained all 
the loan restrictions suggested by Arnold (1982). 
The bridge facility was required to pay in full on or 
before the first anniversary of the merger. If not, 
the bridge facility would have converted into term 
loans maturing on the 10th year of the merger. 
The covenants of the bridge loans restricted HCA 
to incur or repay certain debts, to make dividends, 
distributions or redemptions, and to incur liens. 
The covenants mainly represented a restriction of 
balance sheet maintenance. In Table 4, two debt 
facilities provided by banks are compared.
5. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS
The HCA case highlights the importance of un-
derstanding the covenant designs of a buyout deal 
among all counter parties, including PE firms, the 
target company (and its management), and lend-
ing banks. When initiating a buyout deal, PE firms 
and the target company negotiated the term sheet 
and the purchase agreement. In HCA’s term sheet, 
the function of the special committee was strongly 
emphasized. The committee was composed of inde-
pendent and disinterested directors and was estab-
lished to determine the merger agreement was fair 
to and in the best interests of all and unaffiliated 
shareholders of HCA. The purchase agreement 
emphasized the covenants of representations and 
warranties and termination. The representations 
and warranties were based on a material adverse 
effect to prevent from the downside risks of the 
deal. Moreover, the representation and warranties 
were important in mitigating the adverse selection 
problem that involved pre-contractual information 
asymmetry. The termination covenant saved the 
regret possibilities for PE firms and the target 
company but also regulated both sides. From the 
PE firms’ perspectives, the termination prevented 
Table 4. The comparisons of two facilities
Senior secured credit facilities Senior secured second lien loans
Lending banks BoA, JPMCB, CgMI, and MLCC CgMI, Banc of America Bridge, JPMCB,  
and MLCC
Interest rate  – LIBor or higher of BoA prime rate and 
FFr+0.5%
 – LIBor plus a increasing spread
Loan amounts  – $16.8 billion  – $5.7 billion
Loan objectivities  – Financing the buyout, refinancing certain exist-
ing indebtedness, paying transaction fees, and 
providing ongoing working capital
 – Financing the buyout, refinancing certain ex-
isting indebtedness, and paying transaction 
fees
guarantors  – All except European term facilities: HCA and 
its domestic subsidiaries
 – European term loans: HCA’s European subsidi-
aries
 – HCA and its domestic subsidiaries
guarantees  – Asset-based revolving credit facility: Secured by 
a first-priority lien on all present and future Ar
 – others: Secured by a second-priority lien on 
Ar, a first-priority lien on capital stocks, and 
all present and future assets
 – Second-priority lien on the non-Ar and a third-
priority lien on certain AR
Covenants  – restrictions of cash flow control, strategy 
control, default trigger, balance sheet main-
tenance, and asset preservation
 – restrictions of balance sheet maintenance
Source: This research.
T.-W. Wei et al.334
the failure of the deal, set up high penalties for the 
target company, and, at the same time, covered 
the expenses of the target company if it was not 
blamed for the failure. As for the target company, 
the termination clause also effectively prevented 
PE firms from withdrawal or breaking promises.
To ensure that the target company continues 
performing well, the management agreement is of 
great importance. Under the management agree-
ment, to effectively align management incen-
tives with HCA’s interests, pay-to-performance 
programs were designed. The incentive program 
after the buyout deal showed that PE firms may 
keep intact the base salary for the management 
but change the short- and long-term incentives. 
In the short-term incentive design, the PE firms 
evaluated performance based on EBITDA rather 
than EPS. In the long-term incentive design, they 
still emphasized EBITDA since part of stock op-
tions cannot be vested before the EBITDA goal is 
reached. Different from common investors’ prac-
tice, using EPS as an evaluation standard of per-
formance, PE firms designed EBITDA as a perfor-
mance criterion. With EBITDA representing cash 
flow generation, PE firms hinged their incentive 
programs on cash generation as a performance cri-
terion. As it is not easy for the PE firms to detect 
whether management acting in the PE firms’ in-
terests, covenants between PE firms and the man-
agement can effectively reduce agency cost prob-
lems and moral hazard that involves asymmetry 
in post-contractual information.
When considering the loan agreement between 
banks and PE firms along with the target company, 
this study categorized the covenants based on the 
categories of cash flow control, strategy control, 
the default trigger, balance sheet maintenance, 
and asset preservation suggested by Arnold (1982). 
HCA’s loan agreement mainly contained two debt 
categories, senior secured credit facilities and sen-
ior secured second lien loans under a bridge facil-
ity. Both debts were offered to finance the buyout, 
refinance certain existing indebtedness, and pay 
transaction fees, but the funds of the senior se-
cured credit loans could have been used for ongo-
ing working capital. The senior secured credit loans 
held a lower interest rate than the bridge facilities. 
As for the covenants, the study found that senior 
secured credit facilities were designed to follow all 
the restrictions, including cash flow control, strat-
egy control, default trigger, balance sheet mainte-
nance, and asset preservation; while senior secured 
second lien loans mainly focused on maintaining 
the balance sheet. The reason might be that senior 
secured credit loans belong to long-term debts and 
the well-designed restrictions are prerequisite for 
securing ongoing operations and repayments.
This study provides comprehensive empirical 
evidence and an analytical framework including 
all the important contracts among all counter par-
ties. Furthermore, we used public information to 
perform a rigorous analysis and bridged the gap 
between theory and practice. The buyout case of 
the 2006 acquisition of HCA, which was also the 
biggest transaction in the US healthcare industry, 
yields insight into buyout covenants and analyzes 
interests behind each counter party. The covenant 
analytical model can be applied in several differ-
ent arenas.
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